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NOTES AND COMMIENTS

cedure was changed but slightly by the adoption of the Code by the
various States. The writer takes the position that the savings of expense to litigants, the elimination in whole or in part of the congested
dockets of the courts, as well as the interest of the public, dictate a
wider joinder - if not entire freedom thereof.
WImm~Am M. DEEP

JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICTi
What is done in a situation where a jury brings in a verdict for
one party when a verdict should have been directed in favor of the
other partv The most common answer is for the trial judge or the
appellate court to grant a new trial. But such a practice is very unsatisfactory The party for whom the verdict should have been
directed in the first instance is subjected to a lengthy delay He is
burdened with the expenditure of time and effort in addition to the
cost of re-litigation of a case which will undoubtedly end in his favor
if he still has tab on his witnesses and their memories have not dulled
with the passage of time. Also, it is not unthinkable that the other
party may well have time enough for some unscrupulous lawyer to
manufacture new evidence to conform to the appellate court's opinion.
Under the present practice in Kentucky an error of the trial court
in overruling a motion for a directed verdict can only be corrected by
the trial court or the appellate court's granting of a new trial.2 The
only exception is that a judgment non obstante verdicto can be granted
by the appellate court upon the pleadings. Ordinarily, a directed
verdict is proper in a case where the proof is insufficient to disclose
any controversy as to the controlling facts of the case, or where
there is a lack of proof supporting one or more of the material factors of the cause of action propounded so that the case requires only
The Latin term for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, used mostly at
the common law, is non obstante veredicto. The literal translation of non obstante

is notwithstanding, and thus the modern name for the same motion is judgment

notwithstanding the verdict. It is also very common parlance with lawyers and
judges to use the initials n.o.v. for non obstante veredicto and the terms will be
us-ed interchangeably in this note.
'Weikel v. Alt, 234 Ky. 91, 27 S.W 2d 684 (1980); Baskett v. Coombs
Admr., 198 Ky. 17, 247 S.W 1118 (1928); Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Sorg,

180 Ky. 539, 203 S.W 300 (1918); L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 168 Ky. 851,
182 S.W 214, L. R. A. 1916D, 514 (1916); Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore,
154 Kv. 18, 156 SAN 867 (1918); L. & N. Ry. v. Paynter s Admr., 26 Ky. L. Rep.
761, 82 S.WV 412 (1904); Mast. Crowell & Kirkpatrick v. Lehman, 100 Ky. 464,
:38 S.W 1056 (1897).
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an application of the law to the facts proved or admitted. 3 In cases
where a directed verdict is proper and has not been granted and a new
trial is inadequate, is there a more sufficient remedy for the situation?
The procedure in some states, as under the Federal Rules 4, is to allow
the trial court or the appellate court to correct such an erroneous
ruling by sustaining the motion after the verdict is rendered. The
adoption of such a rule would provide for a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. If the trial court finds it should have
sustained the prior motion for a directed verdict, it may then sustain
that motion by ruling upon it. Should the trial court overrule the
motion, the appellate court may order the verdict directed for the
party for whom it should have been directed in the first instance.
Such a right will undoubtedly save the expense of a new trial where
the court rules that the evidence presented would not authorize a
verdict as a matter of law In short, Rule 50 (b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides a simple means of enforcing, without
the expense, delay and uncertainty of a new trial, a right to which
the record shows that a party was entitled at the trial.
Only the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment non obstante veredicto
at common law - Many states have changed the common law rule
so that now such a motion may be entered by either plaintiff or defendant, when it is clear from the pleadings, notwithstanding a verdict
for the adverse party, that the moving party should have a judgment.i
In Kentucky either party may move for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. This is so provided in the code, which states, "Judgment
shall be given for the party whom the pleadings entitle thereto,
though there may have been a verdict against him."T However, this

right may be lost through the trial court's errors prior to refusal to
grant the motion for judgment. For example, m Connecticut Fire In'53 Amf. Jun. 267. "It is the province of the court to aid the jury in the right
discharge of their duty, even to the extent of directing their verdict where the insufficiency or conclusive character of the evidence warrants such a direction. The
exercise by the court of the authority to determine whether or not a plaintiff has
produced evidence which is sufficient in law to sustain a judgment in his favor
is the very essence of judicial power. Thus, courts of general jurisdiction exercising common law powers have inherent power to direct verdicts when the facts
(See cases cited.)
are admitted."
4
FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (b) (1948).
,Judgment non obstante veredicto was used at common law by the plaintiff
when the answer by the defendant admitted a cause of action for the plaintiff,
but set up matter insufficient to avoid the claim of the plaintiff. If a verdict for
the plaintiff was not supported by the pleadings the remedy of the defendant was
to move to arrest the judgment. Freeman, Judgments 17 (5th ed. 192-5); See
notes 12 L.R.A (N.S.) 1021 (1908); 1916E L.R.A. 829 (1916).
'Hill v. Ragland, 114 Ky. 209, 70 S.W 684 (1902); See note, 12 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1021 (1908).
'Ky. CODE Crv. PPAc. ANN. sec. 886 (Carroll's 1948).
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surance Company v Moore,s which was an action on a policy for
fire insurance, there was no allegation of loss in the plaintiffs petition
nor was there any evidence offered by the plaintiff to cure the defect.
The defendant made a motion for a peremptory instruction for a
directed verdict at the close of the evidence and it was deied by
the trial court. The jury then returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant moved for a judgment non obstante, which the
trial court also denied. Upon appeal, the court held that although
the defendant's motion for the peremptory should have been sustained
it could not render a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but only
grant a new trial for the error of the court in refusing the peremptory 9
The defendant was put to the time and expense of a new trial when
he would have been relieved of the burden if the appellate court
could have entered the judgment for him notwithstanding the verdict
to the contrary The plaintiff had his day in court, but as a result of
the insufficiency of the power of the appellate court, he had hIs day
in court twzce upon the same cause of action.
The only cases to which the code provision concerning judgment
notvithstanding the verdict applies in Kentucky are cases on the
pleadings; for instance, where the petition fails to state a cause of action and such failure is not cured by the answer, or the evidence fails
to establish liability on the defendant. In cases such as these even
though a verdict is rendered for the plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to a judgment n. o. v io The Kentucky court, as the courts of
other jurisdictions, being reluctant to change the settled common
lawv rule by judicial decision, has not extended the motion n. o. v
to search the evidence in the absence of statutory authority
In Baskett and Held v Coombs Admnzstratorii the defendants
were being sued for negligence and in their answer made a plea of
contributory negligence which the plaintiff failed to controvert by reply or otherwise. At the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiff,
defendants moved for a peremptory mstructon which was refused.
After the trial they made a motion for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict which was also overruled. On appeal it was held that
the defendant's motion should have been granted by the trial court.
Could the appellate court have corrected this error by granting a
judgment n. o. v., it would have saved further crowding of the
already overwrought dockets. But instead it said.
154 Ky. 18, 156 S.W 867 (1913).
Cases cited note 1 s-upra.

Slusher v. Hubble, 2.54 Ky. 595, 72 S.W 2d 89 (1984).
198 Kv. 17, 247 S.W 1118 (1923).
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"As the plea of contributory negligence was not denied,
it is clear that the motion for peremptory should have been sustained,

but it does not follow that the motion for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict also should have prevailed. I has long been the rule in
this state that where a party asked for a peremptory instruction,
which, because of the condition of the pleadings, should have been
granted, he is not entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,

but only
"x a new tnal for the error of the court in refusing the perempto ry . t

Sheffeld-King Milling Company v Sorg'3 was a case involving
action for the refusal of a buyer to accept flour. The only defense
was a plea of fraud coupled with a counterclaim for damages growing
out of a prior shipment of flour and there was no evidence to support
either the defense or the counterclaim. Plaintiff asked for a peremptory instruction which was refused. On return of the verdict in favor
of the defendant, plaintiff moved for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, and also a new trial. Both motions were overruled. The
appellate court agreed that plaintiff should have been given the peremptory instruction, and was now entitled to a new trial only and
not to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This is another clear
case where under federal rule 50 (b) unnecessary re-litigation could
have been avoided.
Such a practice, whereby the appellate court may enter judgment
non obstante veredicto where the trial court should have directed a
verdict, but did not, and a verdict was returned in favor of the other
party, have not always been looked upon with favor, even in the
federal courts. Pennsylvania passed a law in 19051 which allowed
the trial court to have the evidence made part of the record, and to
have judgment notwithstanding the verdict entered upon it either
by the trial or appellate court, if the evidence should so warrant.
The question of constitutionality of this statute came before the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1908 in the case of Slocum
v New York Life Insurance Company.", By a vote of 5 to 4, with
Mr. Justice Van Devanter speaking for the majority, the court held
that the Constitution of the United States forbade the application
to a trial m the federal courtof Pennsylvania the statute permitting
the entry of judgment for a defendant when the trial court ought to
have directed that very judgment, but had erroneously refused to
do so. A verdict should confessedly have been ordered at the trial
as a matter of law; nevertheless, according to the decision of the
'-Id. at 18, S.W at 1119.
" 180 Ky. 539, 203 S.I r 300 (1918).

(1905), c. 198, now 12
(1912).
59028 LAWS
U.S. 364

:PA.

PA. STAr. ANN. see.

684 (Purdon 1931).
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Supreme Court, Pennsylvania could not by statute do the very thing
the trial judge should have done without violating the Seventh Amendment of the Federal Constitution which guarantees the right of trial
by jury I,
Not long after the decision, Ezra R. Thayer and J. L. Thorndike,17
wrote articles in legal periodicals suggesting how a different result
might have been reached. They thought that, had the Pennsylvania
statute provided first for a reservation by the trial judge of his decision on the motion for directed verdict and then for a submission of
the case to the jury with leave reserved by the consent of the jury,
to enter an alternate verdict if the trial or appellate court's decision
so demanded, then the constitutional objection would be avoided.
In this way, the verdict, even though changed, is still the verdict
which was authorized by the jury and therefore not a verdict disregarded by the trial or appellate court.
Essentially the very procedure suggested by the writers was enacted in a New York statute.'" The case of Baltimore & CarolinaLine
v Redman" presented the constitutionality of this statute to the
Supreme Court. In the federal district court, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff after the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The circuit court of appeals held that the district court committed a reversible error in not granting the defendant's motion but declined to enter final judgment for the defendant, and instead, sent
the case back for a new trial. On appeal to the Supreme Court the
defendant argued that the circuit court of appeals should have entered a final judgment in his favor since that was what the district
court would have been required to do under the New York procedure
if it had decided the reserved motion as the circuit court of appeals
held it should have. The plaintiff urged that the statute came within
the scope of the Slocum case and so was unconstitutional. The same
judge who delivered the opinion in the Slocum case did so m this
case holding the New York statute constitutional. The court did not
hold the law good upon the grounds suggested by the two comments,
but rather upon historical grounds, declaring that this method was
part of the American common law practice at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution-" and was not an mfrmgement of the right of trial
" "In suits at common law, where the value of the controversy shall exceed

twenty dollars, the right of trial by ]ury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a

jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common lav."

Thayer, Judicial Administration, 63 Unmv. Pa. L. Rev. 585 (1915); Thorndike, Trial by Jury m the United States Courts, 26 Hay. L. Rev. 732 (1913).
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT Sec. 461 (Cahill 1931).
"55 S.Ct. 890 (1935).
" Chinoweth v. Lessee of Haskell, 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 92 (1830).
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by jury- thus it could be safely adhered to m the federal courts. It
was held that the circuit court of appeals should have dismissed the
complaint and entered a final judgment for the defendant.
It may be argued that judgment non obstante veredicto might
prevent justice. The plaintiff may gather new evidence to be presented at the new trial or the error may have been a technicality of
the pleadings.2 1 Mr. Justice Hughes ably answered this objection in
his dissenting opinion in the Slocum case (which later became law).
He said.
"It is said, however, that a new trial affords opportunity to
a plaintiff to better Ins case by presenting evidence wuch may not
have been available before. But we are not dealing with an application for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence, or
with the principles controlling an application of that sort. We are
concerned with the question of whether a party has a constitutional
right to another trial, simply because the trial court erred m its determination of a question of law which was decisive of the case made.
Had the trial court done what the court says it should have done, it
would have directed a verdict for the defendant, and if the jury,
simply following the instruction of the trial court, had so found, final
judgment would have been entered and no new trial would now be
granted. Still the jury would not have passed upon any question of
fact, but would simply have obeyed the judge. The opportunitv to

better the case on a second trial would probably be as welcome, but
it would not be accorded. I am unable to see any basis for a constitutional distinction which raises a constitutional right to another
trial in the one case and not in the other.'

It is urged that when Kentucky adopts its new code rule 50 (b)
of the Federal Rules, or its equivalent, be incorporated. Without
such practice, when a new trial is granted where a judgment n. o. v
should have been given, the judicial system is giving what Thayer
said, "
is not merely the right of trial bv jury, but the right of
two trials by )ury"23 This practice, if adopted m Kentucky would
save many litigants the great expense and the time involved in a
new trial, and would also save the courts from seriously overcrowded
dockets. As justice Hughes said:
"We have here a simplification of procedure adopted in
the public interest to the end that unnecessary litigation may be
avoided. The party obtains the judgment which in law he should
have according to the record.""1

HuGH C. EvANs
-"Losville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 168 Ky. 351, 182 S.W 214
(1916); Mast, Crowell & Kirkpatrick v. Lehman, 100 Ky. 464, 38 S.V 1056
(1897).
2228 U.S. 364 at 427 (1912).
Thayer, Judicial Admimstration. 63 Umv. Pa. L. Rev. 585, 588 (1915).
2 See note 24 supra.

